z一篇鄙视郎的文章，未来不一定黑暗。换个角度思考。--- 从郎咸平现象看中国人的无知首先我想说下为什么郎咸平的言论会得到很多人的支持
这个是和我们国家所处的阶段有关，因为国家要发展建设，必须培养很多理工科的人才，对于人文经济方面不是很重视
产生的结果就是绝大多数人对经济学不了解，很容易被欺骗
我先来驳斥郎咸平的最近的观点
未来和下一代很悲惨，我都不想讲了
郎的这个标题一定是错误的，为什么这样说呢？要从中国目前的经济发展阶段谈起 大家千万不要以为中国的改革真的是独创的 社会主义国家中匈牙利很早就开始改革了，那才是社会主义国家改革开放的创始人
中国的经济发展路线实际是以日本发展模式为目标的 目前大概处于日本70年代阶段 那个时候日本也是个污染严重的国家 这个问题后面再讲。
先说下中国最近30年的发展吧，可以说这30年的成绩是个不错的成绩。但是成绩的背后是有一些问题的。一个最关键的问题是之所以30年来平均增长速度飞快，并不是我们太优秀了，而是我们过去太落后了。目前中国的人均收入，大概仍然相当于日本和美国的十六分之一，大家同住在一个地球上，为什么差距这么大呢？这个我们不能抱怨 先查下我们人均大学生数量和别的国家相差多少。
重点来了，人均十六分之一仍然是个很低的水平，我相信10年时间发展到八分之一大家不会有什么不同意见吧 所以我敢和郎打赌 10年内明天会更好，而绝不是什么 未来和下一代很悲惨，我都不想讲了
在我看来，中国目前的问题绝对不是什么经济问题。而是教育和政治的问题。中国的大学生不是太多了，而是还不够。但是大学教育需要改革，如果我来做教育部长，相信中国可以更快发展。大学应该改成美国的那种宽进严出 这样才能给社会提供更多人才，也能让更多人受教育。
相信我没有错，中国今天的成绩和恢复高考制度有着必然的联系，印度如果在教育水平上不能追上中国，他们永远都在我们后面。不过说到这个很讽刺，就是在教育问题上我们做得也并不好。但是由于我们的经济基础很差，所以经济目前仍会飞速发展
有人或许会问，现在工厂都倒闭了，还怎么发展
这要从经济发展的规律来解释了 任何一个经济体 都是 繁荣 衰退 萧条 复苏 这样周而复始发展的 中国的经济实际从去年夏天就进入衰退了，标志就是楼市 股市双跳水 我很坦白的说，这种衰退是无法避免的 幸运的是我们国家目前仍然处于非固定资本不可自由兑换
通俗的说就是大笔的钱不能自由出入中国，所以我们没有出现日本那种大萧条 而且这次衰退可以说是中国自己安排的 为什么温说08年最困难，不是没有道理的（中国自己缩紧银根就是为了刺破股市 楼市
的泡沫 从而引发衰退 为下一次开始增长作准备）
这里我想谈到另一个问题 经济增长的速度越快衰退起来就越恐怖
这也是为什么国家一直强调控制增长的速度在8%左右，就是为了避免萧条时期带来过大的动荡
说了这么多了，谈一下未来中国的发展方向吧。以日本的发展做参考，我们未来十年将以节能 环保为重点继续前进。涛哥访华不是说了要和日本在节能 环保技术上合作，这也是没有办法 我们确实到了这个阶段。大概10到15年后，我们大概可以达到日本80年代的水平
那个时候环境问题基本可以解决 我相信日本今天的发展水平大家大致可以满意，日本的今天将是我们的明天 这就是国家计划的路线
只不过我们和他们有很大的不同，就是中国是独立国家 日本是美国的附属国 相信大约20年后，就轮到日本人羡慕中国人了
下面我想谈另一个严肃的问题，这个问题就是中国的权力缺乏监督的问题了，这个问题远比教育问题严重，解决不好一定出大事情
也正是这个问题导致了郎在中国有市场 不过，二十年内这个问题还不会浮出水面。很简单，中国的经济至少可以再增长20年 只要人均收入一直提高，腐败等等大家就能够暂时接受 我相信如果一个市长把市里每个人都带成百万富翁 自己贪了一个亿，大家是不会赶他下台的。
关于郎的6+1这个时髦的观点，我想提个问题，为什么掌握了6的美国连年赤字，最不赚钱的中国却大笔外汇存款。6不是最赚钱的吗？有人会说什么中国卖资源 血汗工厂。我可以客观的告诉你，卖铁矿的是澳大利亚卖石油的是中东。真正的问题不在这里，如果你自认自己懂经济学，希望你能自己思考下找到答案。中国在经济学知识的普及上确实很不够，但目前这并不妨碍中国的发展。只有当中国发展到今天日本的水平以后 才是中国的经济学家该有作为的时候。毕竟日本90年代进入了死胡同，今天也没能走出来
最后我说下30年改革后最悲哀的事情吧 就是大家的思想发生了变化
为了赚钱可以不择手段（我认为郎就是这种人，作为一个学过经济学的人，居然故意抛出错误的结论来换取知名度，太可悲） 另外一个就是贫富分化这是没有办法的事情，郎的支持者多是不满现状的人 看到很多人富裕起来 就把这个归咎为政府的错误，请为你们有为这个社会做出什么贡献没
我不否认郎的一些言论是正确的，但这不能作为故意得出错误的盾牌，可以说他是别有用心的（为钱或为名）如果他真的为中国考虑，走孙中山的道路，我尊敬他 如果只是在那里哗众取宠 那么我唾弃他 中国改革开放30年的成就，他一分功劳也没有今天回到中国就和法伦功一样在这里妖言惑众 我第一个鄙视他
法伦功告诉大家不吃药可以治病 郎咸平告诉大家你们会死得很惨
不同的事情，却是中国人同样的无知
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每一个善良的中国人，当你贫穷的时候请你问一下自己，你是否努力过
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把浪县平和李宏治放在一起比较，一定是中国经济专家[比那卡 (10-24 18:36, Long long ago)] [ 传统版 | sForum ][登录后回复]2楼
z 一个有意思的观点，挑重点转。---- 政府向左，我向右－－-个人经济发展心得 赚钱心得：
一、父母响应国家号召，无私奉贤一辈子，结果到头来发现自己挺惨的，前几年还需要拿着微薄的退休工资养活大哥一家3口人。
搞得我现在对某人也好，国家也罢，只要号召我去干嘛，我就条件反射似的敏感，怀疑一定有极大阴谋。。。
二、大部分人都会听从国家操控的舆论导向，如果跟随号召有利可图，那么就应该富人多，穷人少；而事实是富人少，穷人多。。
三、事物是多面性的，不同的人以不同的角度去观察同一件事物，会得出不同的正确看法，但这不同的正确看法之间往往是相矛盾、错误的。
比如，同是赚钱，农民认为赚一个是一个。他目光短浅点的看法正确不？非常正确！因为他只是农民，把握赚明天的钱的能力不够。
大企业家认为需要把目光放在五年后才赚钱，也非常正确！因为五年后他能在总量上赚更多！
你对农民说，要把目光放在5年后才去赚，他非骂你是个SB不可！为啥？
他本只想赚到明天的工钱，却不料包工头当夜就跑路了，还告状无门讨要无路。你还想让他赚5年后的钱，站在他的角度上去看，你不是SB是什么？同理，你对大企业家说赚一个是一个，他也会骂你无知。
每个人，每个组织，都会以对自己有利的那一面去看待问题，并且都能得出逻辑上正确的结论。
如果这个组织能控制舆论，那么这个组织一定会利用舆论，制造出以自己的利益角度看待的，逻辑上也正确的舆论导向。
我没有获得一手宏观经济信息的渠道，也没学深奥的经济研究方法，更没有一大批专家学者做智囊团，但是政府有这些。
政府会依据国家宏观信息，国家经济运行实际状态，内幕情况，去制造对自身有利的舆论导向，去号召大家“无私奉献”，奉献多了，人也自然穷了。----从建国到现在，听从号召去实施行动的，在经济层面上，没产生一个富人。
父母已被成功忽悠一辈子，教训深刻！！俺不玩，在经济行为上，实行彻头彻尾的政府向左，我向右。
CCTV是我这样的“民工”选择符合自身，正确的赚钱方式的唯一风向标！CCTV我爱死你了！！！[hula (10-24 18:50, Long long ago)]
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(引用 hula:z 一个有意思的观点，挑重点转。---- 政府向左，我向右－－-个人经济发展心得 赚钱心得：
一、父母响应国家号召，无私奉贤一...)例证 04年开始调控房价。加息，涨税，限制二套房交易，国家号召我别炒房。
我偏炒，结果房价接连向上翻了四个跟头。
以前从不玩股票的，去年股市3000点后，国家上调准备金利率、加息、上调印花税。国家摆明了号召我别玩股票。
我偏立刻杀入股市，结果股指一路凯歌攀上6124点。。。。
去年年底到今年年初，国家请了些经济学家、专家教授成天在CCTV，拐弯抹角的表示国家的宏观经济基本面良好，声称现在谈论股市、楼市的拐点为时尚早。
我的妈也，这不是号召我别退市吗？
立刻决定股市、楼市、公司里的所有中低档产品来个全线“跳楼大甩卖”。
结果，响应国家号召，没全线跳楼大甩卖的朋友，现在全真的要跳楼了。。。哈哈
前天父母从家乡打电话来，说当地某新楼盘很不错，价格也很便宜，想买一套。
我犹豫了，说价格低吧，确实很低；说孝敬父母吧，尽管他们不住，可他们想要的东西，不管是什么都想买给他们。
犹豫到今天，国家整出个10-22救市方案，号召我去买房。哈哈哈哈，这下不犹豫了，我想把最后一套自己住的房子都卖了，租房住！！！[hula (10-24 18:53, Long long ago)]
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去年本坛曾转过郎咸平的一篇演讲, 看了一半, 就忍不住赞叹中国真奇妙
连这样的人都能混下去, 都能被称为经济学家, 都能到处演讲. 真是泥沙俱下啊.
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可以这样说, 他连经济的最根本实质都不懂.
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我记得当时他 是在东北一所高校演讲, 题目很耸动. 大概是讲为什么中国人越苦干越穷, 美国人越消费, 越享受越富.
他的解释是, 中国占据了价值链的末端, 还举了个例子,
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郎咸平：在整个国际生产的链条中，中国处于最末端的生产组装位置，这是"后发优势"所决定的，引进外国的低档次技术和资本，中国形成了一个世界加工厂。你在整条国际分工的产业链上，被定位在了价值最低的制造业。我不断地以芭比娃娃为例说明，芭比娃娃去年在中国产生了严重的贸易纠纷。各位知不知道在美国市场沃尔玛9.99元美金芭比娃娃，中国的出厂价是多少？1元美金。我也在说，真正的制造业大国是美国。它只是把整个制造业产业链里面价值最差的部分给我们中国人做，这就是我们目前在干的事。
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他说中国人苦干了, 出厂价才一元, 所以穷, 美国市场沃尔玛卖9.99元, 所以美国人不费吹灰之力就赚了 8.99 元, 所以美国大赚了, 是真正的制造大国.
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这简直是屁话, 老美要有他那么聪明, 干脆把所有从中国进口的东西加价 1000 倍在本土卖, 那岂不就更富了, 中国只占价值链的千分之一
岂不就更穷了?
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他甚至连中世纪威尼斯人的发现都不懂----一个地方的繁荣取决于其他地方对他的产品的渴求程度.
所以威尼斯曾有法律规定, 不许会造玻璃的工匠出境, 以免技术外泄,
中国古代的繁荣, 和他的丝绸, 瓷器, 铁, 盐等产品的出口, 边贸有很大关系.
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请问美国还有多少技术和产品是其他地方造不出来的, 奇货可居的? 他有什么东西是外部世界渴求的?
这才是美国走向暮落的关键, 房贷之类只是一个引线而已.
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如果外部世界不需要美国的产品, 他就是把进口产品加价一亿倍在本国卖, 他还是要玩完.
经济学家郎咸平能听明白么?
实体经济才是根本, 靠虚拟经济能忽悠其他国家多久?
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中国真奇妙, 能出了郎咸平这么一个人物, 到处演讲.
我呸, 虽然在下是理工出身, 还是要鄙视一下这种经济学家.
[花豹 (10-25 2:02, Long long ago)]
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朗咸平根本不用必是鄙视，完全可以忽视的人唉，中国经常是懂得人不讲；讲的人不懂
faint
[门中木 (10-25 9:23, Long long ago)]
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他说的危言耸听不讨好，不过如果能够引起政府企业对技术创新和研发重视，也算功德圆满他需要以一个 殉道者 的形式出现， 才是一个悲哀[Solstice (10-25 10:23, Long long ago)] [ 传统版 | sForum ][登录后回复]7楼
(引用 hula:例证 04年开始调控房价。加息，涨税，限制二套房交易，国家号召我别炒房。
我偏炒，结果房价接连向上翻了四个跟头。
...)纯属自己给脸上贴金中国政府号召买房从上个世纪末住房商业化的时候就开始了，那个时候在上海花17万买套房还送户口，这个他怎么不提？
股市号召入市是998之前的事了，那个时候入，去年上调印花税的时候出，差不多是4倍。
这个作者近4000点入，到今年年初也就剩下4000多点，基本没赚钱[blank (10-25 10:37, Long long ago)]
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转一篇Henry Paulson的文章，foreign affairs上面的A Strategic Economic Engagement
Strengthening U.S.-Chinese Ties
By Henry M. Paulson Jr.
From Foreign Affairs , September/October 2008
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Summary: The prosperity of the United States and China depends on helping China further integrate into the global economic system.
Henry M. Paulson, Jr. is U.S. Secretary of the Treasury.
One of the first challenges the next U.S. president will face will be how to respond to China's emergence as a global power. Some people suggest that China is a threat that must be countered or contained. Others argue that its growth is an opportunity for the U.S. economy and that Washington should manage this rising power through engagement. I believe that engagement is the only path to success.
President George W. Bush chose this approach, and it has been successful. U.S.-Chinese relations are more productive today than ever before, partly because President Bush engaged Beijing and did so based on the recognition of China's twin priorities: territorial integrity and economic growth. Even if it were possible to block China's growth, it would not be in the United States' interest to try. China's rapid emergence as a global economic power presents numerous challenges on issues ranging from trade and investment to commodity markets and the environment. But the inextricable interdependence of China's growth and that of the global economy requires a policy of engagement. In fact, the overriding importance of economic growth to China's leaders presents the best means of influencing China's emergence as a global power and encouraging its integration into the international system.
To be effective, however, Washington must first understand Beijing's interests and the challenges it faces. The Chinese see economic growth as essential to their stability. Three decades of economic development have transformed their country, bringing it peace and stability and lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. The Chinese are deeply proud of these accomplishments yet are concerned about their ability to sustain them. Their leaders, meanwhile, realize that China's future growth depends on its increasing integration into global trade, investment, and financial markets.
The United States and China share many interests, but as is inevitable in any broad and complex relationship, they also have significant differences. When it comes to China's military modernization, its enforcement of intellectual property rights, and its human rights record, Washington and Beijing have strongly diverging views and sometimes competing interests. On such issues, Washington must be both direct and vigilant in its efforts to advance U.S. interests bilaterally or, where appropriate, multilaterally. Such an approach will invariably create tensions, as it sometimes does in the United States' relations with other countries. But differences with China must not be allowed to stand in the way of progress and cooperation.
The United States and China -- and, indeed, the international community -- share a powerful interest in China's successful integration into the global economic system. The prosperity of both nations depends on the ability of each to achieve balanced economic growth, on stable and vibrant trade and financial regimes, on diverse and dependable energy sources, and on sustainable progress that protects human health and the environment.
UNDERSTANDING CHINA
In 2006, President Bush and Chinese President Hu Jintao launched the U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) to manage both immediate tensions between the two countries and their expanding relationship over the long term. The approach has worked, largely because it has recognized China's realities -- seeing the country as it actually is, not as many Americans imagine it to be. Washington understands, for example, that robust and sustained economic growth is a social imperative for China and that Beijing views its international interactions primarily through an economic lens. Hence, approaching Beijing through economic issues of interest to both countries is an effective way to produce tangible results in economic and noneconomic areas.
Perhaps as a consequence of their troubled memories of the central planning, autarky, and mass mobilization of a few decades ago, China's leaders today are committed to reform, at least so long as it improves the country's political and economic stability. Every Chinese official older than the age of 50 experienced the calamities of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. In a country now so dynamic that entire blocks can be demolished and rebuilt in two weeks, people are searching for stability and balance. President Hu has said that it is the Chinese government's job to ensure "harmony," and this belief has reinforced Beijing's tendency toward caution in decision-making. Thus, with every policy, Beijing considers whether it is riskier to move too quickly or too slowly down the path of reform. The challenge for Washington is to understand China's perception of its self-interest, identify opportunities to persuade China that its interests and those of the United States often are the same, and narrow real differences whenever possible.
Despite the two countries' long history of interaction, they frequently display a stunning ability to misunderstand each other. A productive relationship requires that U.S. and Chinese policymakers engage at the highest levels in ways that lessen misperceptions and miscommunications. The SED accomplishes this by focusing on dialogues between top-level officials who treat one another as equals and engage on issues at the strategic level. For example, a bilateral air-services agreement was concluded during the second SED meeting, in May 2007. Lower-level negotiations on such an agreement had been stalled for some time because China was focused on developing the competitiveness of its domestic aviation industry and limiting international competition. But through the SED, I brought this issue to the attention of my counterpart, then Vice Premier Wu Yi, and explained how the increased exchange of people and goods between our two countries would strengthen their relationship. Thanks to the agreement, U.S. passenger flights to and from China will more than double by 2012, and air-cargo companies from both countries will enjoy full liberalization of the industry, including the lifting of restrictions on the frequency and price of flights, by 2011.
EQUALITY AND TRUST
The Chinese are proud of their country's emergence on the world stage and rightly seek credit for its accomplishments. After nearly two centuries of exploitation by foreign powers, China feels it is important to defend its national interests, particularly against foreign demands. Unfortunately, the United States has often been perceived as arrogant and aggressive in its interactions with China, even when it has pursued legitimate interests.
U.S. officials are more effective when they understand the Chinese people's perspective. This is one reason why I travel to China so often; nothing can substitute for personal interactions with top decision-makers, especially in China, where respect and friendship are particularly prized. My counterparts in the SED, Vice Premier Wang Qishan and, before him, then Vice Premier Wu, have emphasized the importance of mutual trust. Establishing relationships at the top of the Chinese government has been key to the U.S. government's success with the SED.
One of the reasons relationship building is so important is that government decisions in China are often made by consensus and after much consultation. Reform progresses best when an umbrella of support at the top facilitates change at lower levels. Officially, the most important decisions are made by President Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao, but unofficially, decisions are increasingly made through a consensus-oriented process involving powerful government ministries. The SED's high-level, cross-agency approach recognizes this reality and brings key decision-makers to the table to build broad support for reform.
When the SED was first launched, in September 2006, few believed much progress would be possible. I was warned, by people in the United States and China, that the timing could not be worse to discuss economic issues. The 2006 U.S. midterm elections were just months away, the U.S. presidential campaign was already taking shape, and Beijing was preparing to appoint a new generation of leaders. Nevertheless, I believed direct engagement was the only way forward: there were too many critical issues between the United States and China that simply could not be allowed to drift without strategic direction.
The result was the SED, which is led at the vice-premier level in China and by the lead economic cabinet secretary on the U.S. side, and there is cabinet-level representation from all ministries with responsibilities for economic issues. To break down traditional government silos, Chinese ministers and U.S. cabinet secretaries participate in every session, all of which my Chinese counterpart and I lead. Discussions cover a variety of strategic issues, of both immediate and long-term concern, and are mostly unstructured. Unlike in other U.S.-Chinese economic dialogues, in the SED each side's commitments are recorded and publicized at the end of the sessions and then meticulously followed up on at the highest levels to ensure that they are fully implemented.
Recognizing that the active support and engagement of the president's office on broader economic questions is very important in both countries, twice a year the U.S. and Chinese governments hold cabinet-level meetings, which include the president of the host country. I have had regular and welcome access to President Hu and Premier Wen to talk about the most important economic issues in the U.S.-Chinese relationship. In August 2007, I discussed the adverse impact of economic nationalism in both the United States and China with President Hu. I believe that our candid discussion, which focused on areas of mutual interest, such as keeping each country's market open to the other's trade and investment, gave President Hu a better understanding of why China's growth and stability depend on its moving forward with liberalization, despite resistance from its domestic industry.
The SED's interagency approach also allows all the ministers and cabinet officials to hear arguments from all sides, and that, in turn, informs the decision-making process. For example, the governor of the People's Bank of China, Zhou Xiaochuan, does not decide the pace of the renminbi's appreciation on his own; through the SED, all the ministers involved in that decision can discuss it with the U.S. representatives. During the second SED meeting, in Washington in May 2007, the chair of the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, highlighted to 15 Chinese ministers the urgency of rebalancing China's growth and reforming its exchange-rate policy. Seldom in the history of U.S.-Chinese relations has there been such an opportunity to speak directly to the entire Chinese economic leadership at once on such a pressing economic challenge. Likewise, the U.S. cabinet's understanding of China improves when it hears firsthand top Chinese policymakers explain the rationales for their positions.
Encouraging communication across stovepiped bureaucracies maximizes results. Before the SED's December 2007 meeting, China's State Environmental Protection Agency, or SEPA (since upgraded to the Ministry of Environmental Protection), had been working with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for years on an emissions-trading program for sulfur dioxide in China. It had conducted pilot projects at the local level but had been unsuccessful in expanding the effort nationally. After the SED brought the discussion to key offices of China's State Council, relevant Chinese ministries, and opinion leaders and companies in China, it helped SEPA gain broad support among the senior Chinese leadership, paving the way for Beijing to announce at the third SED meeting, in December 2007, that it would develop a nationwide program on sulfur-dioxide-emissions trading in the power sector. This was a meaningful step toward using market forces to address pollution and provide cleaner air in China. The move will also expand U.S. export markets and create jobs for U.S. environmental companies, which lead the world in developing the kinds of technologies necessary for such a program.
OVERLAPPING INTERESTS
By focusing on policy areas in which China's reform agenda intersects with U.S. interests, the SED has found new and constructive ways to discuss some of the most important and contentious matters in the U.S.-Chinese economic relationship, including growth imbalances, energy security and environmental sustainability, trade and investment issues (including product safety), and China's position in the global economic system. Addressing these questions not only serves the interests of the Chinese people but also is vital to both the economic strength of the United States (which welcomes access to this important export market) and the continued strength of the global economy. Americans who worry that China might overtake the United States are worrying about the wrong thing. They should instead be concerned that Beijing may not make key reforms or that it will face significant economic difficulties down the road. Serious troubles in China's economy could threaten the stability of the U.S. and global economies.
Despite the emergence of China as a global economic power -- it now has the fourth-largest GDP in the world -- it is still a developing country, ranking only one-hundredth in the world in per capita GDP. China's income growth has been widespread but uneven; consequently, income inequality has risen sharply in the last three decades. One indicator of this inequality is enrollment rates in China's provincial high schools, for which parents must pay fees. Earlier in the reform era, there were only small differences in such rates across provinces, but by 2003 enrollment was nearing 100 percent in the wealthier provinces, compared with less than 40 percent in the poorer ones. With China's social stability anchored in the belief that the wealth boom will eventually filter down to everyone, continued growth remains Chinese leaders' most important priority. But the challenges of sustaining growth and reducing income inequality are becoming more formidable as China's economy grows more complex, its exports begin to saturate overseas markets, its population ages, and domestic demands for a clean environment intensify.
Ironically, it is precisely the growth model that spurred China's recent takeoff that may become an obstacle to the country's sustained economic growth and social stability in the future. Over the last four decades, all emerging markets in East Asia have seen their industrial sectors grow, and many have also experienced increases in income inequality. But these shifts have been much greater in China. The country's heavy reliance on exports and investments in its capital-intensive manufacturing industry in order to support growth has promoted the rapid rise of energy consumption (as well as environmental damage), the building up of coastal areas far faster than the country's interior (where 740 million people, or more than half of the population, live), and a dramatic increase in China's trade surplus (which has heightened tensions with its trading partners).
One of the most notable indications of China's imbalanced growth is its large current account surplus, which last year amounted to over 11 percent of the country's GDP. This reflects the fact that China spends much less than it produces and earns and that it has a high rate of national saving. Chinese household consumption was only 35 percent of GDP in 2007, down from roughly 50 percent 30 years ago, when Beijing started market reforms. (Household consumption is roughly 70 percent of GDP in the United States and 60 percent in India.) On the other hand, household savings are high, as individual Chinese try to compensate for the country's thin social safety net, limited options to finance major expenditures such as education, and few investment options other than bank deposits. Demographics will only exacerbate these trends: as China's population ages, the traditional source of support in retirement -- children -- will become increasingly scarce.
China must further develop its financial sector to help reduce this excessive personal savings rate and boost personal consumption. With more financial products and services available to fund major expenditures and insure against misfortune, and with investment options yielding higher returns, Chinese households will be in a position to save less and consume more. A more dynamic and competitive financial sector would also channel resources for investment into the new, less capital-intensive industries, such as the services and information industries, that will drive China's growth in the future.
In order to ensure stable, noninflationary growth in the short term and sustainable growth in the long term, China also needs flexible prices and, in particular, a flexible exchange rate. Beijing's tight management of the renminbi, coupled with its large trade surplus and large capital inflows, has led to a staggering accumulation of foreign exchange reserves -- now totaling over $1.8 trillion. This has prompted the People's Bank of China to issue massive amounts of renminbi so that it can buy up the foreign exchange reserves and keep the currency from appreciating too rapidly -- and that, in turn, has helped fuel inflation despite the central bank's efforts to absorb the excess money by selling bonds and raising bank reserve requirements. Currency appreciation and greater flexibility in China's exchange rate could limit the impact of rising world oil and commodity prices on prices in China and at the same time allow Chinese monetary policy to be a more effective tool for ensuring stable growth. A stronger renminbi would also encourage economic activity in the sectors of the Chinese economy -- particularly services -- that produce for the domestic market. And this would help raise the share of household consumption in China's economy, increasing the role of domestic demand in powering China's growth and making that growth more sustainable in the future.
These issues have been at the center of many SED discussions. As a result of such talks, China's leaders have come to recognize the value of exchange-rate adjustment, in particular, and have significantly accelerated the pace of the renminbi's appreciation. Between July 2005, when the Chinese government first unpegged the renminbi from the U.S. dollar, and mid-June 2008, Beijing allowed the renminbi to appreciate against the dollar by 20 percent on a nominal basis and 23 percent on a real basis. Seventy percent of that appreciation has occurred since the SED began, and half of it over the past year alone. China clearly has much further to go, but the progress to date is an example of how strategic dialogue can yield results.
Thanks to the SED, Washington has worked steadily to help Beijing open China's financial sector, creating new opportunities for Chinese institutions to invest abroad and for U.S. banking, securities, and insurance companies to operate in China, including by enabling them to invest in China's stock markets. U.S. and other foreign financial institutions are industry leaders in China, but they face domestic competitors pushing for protection. The SED continues to explore paths by which the Chinese government can further liberalize China's financial sector, including allowing foreign companies to issue renminbi-denominated stocks and bonds and expanding the permitted scope of business for foreign securities firms.
POWERFUL CHALLENGES
As the two largest consumers and two of the largest importers of oil in the world, the United States and China are natural allies when it comes to energy security. The United States has adopted pro-market policies, pushed for transparency in energy supply and demand, and promoted the development of alternative energy sources, and it has encouraged China to do the same. Yet the United States is still urgently in need of a comprehensive energy policy to ensure its energy security. And so is China. In fact, if China today were as efficient as the United States was in 1970, it would save the equivalent of 16 million barrels of oil a day, or almost 20 percent of the world's daily oil consumption.
There are signs of change. After years of viewing energy as merely an input for economic growth, the Chinese government now increasingly recognizes the need to proactively manage its energy demand. Three key factors have motivated this transition. The first is economic. China has typically set price caps on electricity and subsidized oil in an attempt to promote social stability, but such artificially low prices have encouraged inefficient and wasteful consumption, even as the cost of these programs to the government has increased with rising global energy prices. As a result, the country now faces continued gasoline and diesel shortages, and in times of crisis, the government can no longer ensure a steady supply of energy to its people -- as happened during the snowstorms of early 2008.
Second, China's leaders have recognized that resource scarcity constrains their ability to maintain political stability by improving the population's quality of life. They now realize the need to develop a new, low-energy model of economic growth. There simply are not enough energy resources to allow the world's entire population, or even the third of it represented by the Chinese, to lead the resource-intensive lifestyle that Americans currently enjoy. A way to support higher incomes while placing less of a burden on resources must be found.
The third reason Beijing is increasingly aware of the need to control energy demand is growing popular concern, especially among the middle and upper-middle classes in China, over the environmental degradation caused by inefficient energy use. Approximately 1,000 disputes over environmental protection occur each week in China. Environmental damage there is so severe that according to World Bank estimates, the combined health and nonhealth costs of air and water pollution in China amount to $100 billion a year, or about 5.8 percent of the country's GDP.
Despite the international concern linking China's energy and environmental challenges to climate change, this is not yet a pressure point for Beijing. China's leaders are acutely aware of the enormity of the problem and of its costs to China, be they floods and other natural disasters or the threat of rising sea levels to the country's coastal cities. But they face more pressing short-term, localized environmental issues -- such as polluted water and air, which compromise their people's health -- and they view climate change as a problem created by industrialized countries and hence one for those countries to solve. Beijing still views international discussions and negotiations on the topic as opportunities to get other countries to pay it to reduce the environmental impact of China's economic growth. Existing agreements have given Beijing reason to hope for success with this strategy: in 2007, China received 73 percent of the carbon credits available under the Clean Development Mechanism, a feature of the Kyoto Protocol that allows industrialized states to meet their obligations under the treaty by funding emissions-reduction projects in developing countries.
As China becomes the world's largest and fastest-growing emitter of carbon, the rest of the international community is recognizing that it cannot meet its goals on climate change without a major undertaking by Beijing. Fortunately, there is a constructive path forward. As China makes progress on its immediate energy and environmental challenges by making its economy less energy-intensive through the implementation of low-carbon policies, strategies, and technologies, a corollary benefit will be a reduction in the growth rate of its carbon emissions. And given China's growing role in the global economy, it will soon become clear, first to the rest of the world and then to Beijing, that the Chinese government must assume more responsibility for meeting the challenge of climate change.
Meanwhile, even as the United States and other countries grapple with multilateral treaty negotiations on climate change, the SED has focused its bilateral discussions on the costs of climate change to the United States and China. The ramifications of China's energy policies have been a consistent topic of discussion at the SED, and I have encouraged the Chinese government to move toward a market-determined price for energy. Beijing has had a plan for introducing additional market prices in the energy sector for some time but has been concerned about the instability that such a measure could cause. Beijing's decision to raise fuel prices and eliminate subsidies last June, immediately after the SED's fourth meeting and during a visit by Vice Premier Wang to Washington, was the right move: it is critical for China's stability that such reforms be made while China's economy is strong.
The United States and China recognize that both energy security and environmental protection are crucial for their sustainable development. Although the two countries have different needs and face different challenges, they both want to achieve energy security while maintaining a healthy environment. Out of this shared recognition has come one of the SED's major achievements: the signing of the Ten Year Energy and Environment Cooperation Framework at the SED last June. This framework is a bilateral mechanism focused on creating a new energy-efficient model for sustainable economic development and on addressing the factors that cause climate change through concrete actions. Recognizing that such problems are too big for either government to fix alone, the initiative involves all levels of government, business, and other sectors of society in both countries and focuses on the development and implementation of new technology, the review of current policies, the development of new regulatory and enforcement capacities, and public education. The framework has produced tangible results in the areas of electricity production and transmission, water and air quality, transportation, and forest and wetland conservation -- suggesting the promise that future cooperation between the United States and China holds. Through the framework, the United States and China are already cooperating on joint research on alternative and renewable fuels for transportation and on efforts to improve the water quality of China's rivers, lakes, and streams. Even greater breakthroughs could lie in the years ahead, and this framework provides the next U.S. administration with a critically important foundation on which to continue Washington's economic engagement with China.
TRADE AND INVESTMENT
Trade and investment, once the glue of U.S.-Chinese relations, today represent a source of tension. China's recent economic reform placed the country on a clear path toward becoming a modern economy, and although it has not veered off that path, it no longer clearly embraces the elements necessary to complete its transformation. Exploiting popular anxieties about globalization, economic nationalists in China are questioning the benefits of China's integration into the international economic system.
Beijing has recently adopted policies that seek to restrict foreign access to China's markets, including a new antimonopoly law. Although much will ultimately depend on how this law is implemented, it appears to favor some of the large companies that lead domestic industries, which the Chinese government promotes as "national champions." China's foreign-investment regulations are opaque and increasingly restrictive, and the government continues to grant major subsidies to key domestic industrial sectors. Heavy lobbying by local authorities and by profitable and powerful Chinese businesses is shaping Beijing's industrial policy. As a result, both large U.S. corporations (longtime proponents of bilateral engagement) and smaller U.S. businesses (which are eager to enter new markets in China) are growing concerned about the lack of openness to U.S. products in China. And those U.S. companies with major investments in China have no consistent way to protect them.
Thus, the launching of negotiations for a bilateral investment treaty during the June 2008 SED meeting was particularly important for both countries, as such a treaty would protect the large amount of U.S. investment in China and open up new opportunities for U.S. investors while encouraging more Chinese investment in the United States. The initiative was also significant because China, as the greatest beneficiary of the market reforms it has undertaken, has the most to lose from slowing down or reversing these reforms, and the initiative would keep it on the reform track. As the United States itself has learned, promoting competition and innovation, especially through the protection of intellectual property rights and the advancement of transparency and the rule of law, is essential to sustaining robust economic growth in the long term.
There are serious obstacles ahead, however. Economic nationalism, for one thing, has been a growing concern in the United States in recent years. Low-cost imports, particularly from China, sometimes have a negative image among the American public, even though they have helped the United States contain inflation and both maximized the choice of products available to Americans and minimized their costs. Foreign investment into the United States, especially by sovereign wealth funds and state-owned enterprises, is also increasingly viewed with suspicion by some U.S. companies, various members of the national security community, and the American public at large, despite regulations by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States that provide sufficient protections in sensitive sectors.
These concerns are misplaced. Like many countries accumulating large foreign exchange reserves, China is simply looking for profitable places to invest them over the long term. China invests its reserves in U.S. securities, including U.S. Treasuries, but there is little Chinese direct investment in the United States. This is largely because Chinese companies are just beginning to invest in their export markets and are unsure whether they are welcome. In any event, the United States would do well to encourage such investment from anywhere in the world -- including China -- because it represents a vote of confidence in the U.S. economy and it promotes growth, jobs, and productivity in the United States.
The size of the bilateral trade imbalance -- $256.2 billion in 2007 -- has also been a bone of contention. It is a source of anxiety in both the United States and China. Beijing believes that the trade deficit could be reduced if Washington dropped export controls and allowed sensitive technologies that may also have military applications to reach Chinese markets. In fact, U.S. export controls have only a marginal effect on the bilateral trade imbalance: in 2007, export license applications were required for $9.7 billion worth of U.S. goods destined for China, and just 0.7 percent of these applications were denied -- a drop in the bucket. Removing all export controls in 2007 would have affected only 0.0265 percent of the U.S.-Chinese trade deficit.
A real issue is the inadequate protection of intellectual property rights in China, which has been an obstacle to increased U.S. trade with and investment in China and has prevented a reduction in the bilateral trade imbalance. This and the theft or pirating of goods are big problems for many U.S. companies operating in China and a reason others are reluctant to do business there. To protect themselves, some U.S. companies purposefully introduce older products into the Chinese market, releasing the newer goods only once the older ones have been copied.
But these and other strategies are merely stopgap measures. As China pursues its quest to develop a modern economy focused on technology, the Chinese government and Chinese companies will increasingly recognize the need to reward the creativity of their own firms and entrepreneurs by strengthening and enforcing intellectual property laws and regulations. It is by improving and enforcing its intellectual property laws that China will accelerate the development and competitiveness of its economy and also open up new market opportunities in China for companies around the world.
CHINA AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
China's return to the world stage as a global economic power has greater consequences than the rise of other nations with comparable per capita incomes. This is partly because few economies at China's level of development have had to address such a complex array of regulatory and governance challenges. Major developed economies are demanding that China do more than most developing nations at an equivalent stage of development. Given its substantial impact on the global economy, China must accept greater responsibilities. If it does not, other countries are likely to blame it for many of their own economic problems. China is already cited as an example of the ills of globalization, such as unsafe products and job losses in other countries. It risks further endangering its reputation, which could hurt its economic growth in the long term. As a country deeply invested in the global economic system, China would benefit from playing an increasingly proactive role in global economic decision-making. And yet it seems to be doing the opposite in the Doha Round of international trade negotiations. Its insistence on protecting its own industrial development is driving other countries to do the same and has been a major factor in the growing antiglobalization and protectionist sentiment around the world.
This point notwithstanding, China's diplomacy has been more effective than is often acknowledged. China has been deft in exercising its soft power to advance its economic interests around the world. In 2006, it hosted the first summit and third ministerial conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, inviting delegations from nearly 50 countries in Africa to Beijing for a weeklong celebration of China's growing relationship with the continent. At the conference's conclusion, Beijing pledged to unconditionally double its aid to Africa by 2009 -- thus indirectly opening the door to additional Chinese investment in the continent. China's bilateral engagement has generally focused on developing mutually beneficial economic objectives. Some of the resulting relationships, such as those with Angola and Sudan, have occasionally been at odds with international norms or have undermined the World Bank's efforts to promote transparency. But Beijing now recognizes that its future economic growth is tied to the continued success of the global system, and it is beginning to contribute more to the international community. It is becoming a more responsible trading and investment partner in Africa and Latin America, for example. In 2007, China contributed for the first time to the International Development Association, the branch of the World Bank that provides grants and low-interest credit to the world's poorest countries. It now collaborates with the World Bank on projects in Africa. It has recently joined the Financial Action Task Force, the multilateral organization that assesses countries' efforts to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. And it is in talks to join the Inter-American Development Bank. U.S. officials have encouraged these efforts through the SED and so facilitated China's integration into the global economic system.
Beijing has recently realized some of the unpleasant implications of working outside the global economic system, especially in the energy sector. It has tended to pursue a mercantilist policy regarding energy security in an attempt to protect itself against the price fluctuations and supply disruptions intrinsic to the global oil market. But its attempts to lock in oil supplies by investing in facilities in troubled countries such as Iran and Sudan have not succeeded. China has paid above-market prices for overseas exploration and extraction projects, and these efforts have helped it meet only five percent of its demand in imported oil; it still depends on global markets to meet the remaining 95 percent. China is simply too large a nation with too great a domestic demand to buy its way to energy security. Moreover, as Beijing has recently begun to recognize, the cost of doing business with sketchy governments comes at a substantial political price. China's investments in Sudan, for example, have tarnished its international reputation. Concerns have emerged among the Chinese people, too, after several Chinese citizens were caught and killed by Sudanese rebels in Darfur. Likewise, as Tehran continues to face censure for its nuclear-development activities, Beijing is gradually realizing that doing business in Iran is becoming increasingly complex and increasingly costly to its image.
Like China's top officials, China's business leaders have begun to recognize the negative impact of China's reputation as an opportunist. The China National Offshore Oil Corporation, or CNOOC, has been paying more and more attention to social responsibility and is making it one of the tenets of the company's oil-exploration activities around the world. Through the SED, the U.S. government has worked to foster Beijing's awareness that China, like the United States, is a stakeholder in the global economic system. Washington has encouraged Beijing, for instance, to join the Congo Basin Forest Partnership, an initiative that promotes the sustainable management of resources in the Congo River Basin. And these efforts are making a difference. At the SED meeting last June, the two governments agreed for the first time to work together to promote global sustainable forest management. Change is occurring as Beijing recognizes the benefits of participating in and contributing to the international system.
LOOKING AHEAD
Going forward, there are three possible ways for the United States and China to pursue their economic and trade relations: robust engagement, dispute resolution through multilateral and bilateral enforcement measures, or punitive legislation. Since a retributive policy would be counterproductive and would harm U.S. economic interests, the U.S. government has chosen the first two approaches.
And rightly so. Since Washington stepped up its economic engagement with Beijing through the SED two years ago, the U.S.-Chinese relationship has deepened and expanded. By encouraging top-level discussions of the two countries' long-term strategic priorities, the SED has found effective ways to manage short-term tensions surrounding trade disputes. It has alleviated a complex set of concerns in the U.S. Congress in a way that has led to a significant appreciation of the renminbi and forestalled dangerous protectionist legislation. At the same time that U.S. consumers were growing deeply concerned about product safety, the SED developed a comprehensive plan for improving the quality and regulatory oversight of foods and drugs imported from China (the effort could even serve as a global model for product safety). And as the world was becoming more eager to reduce its dependence on oil, the SED initiated the Ten Year Energy and Environment Cooperation Framework to help expedite the United States' and China's efforts to increase their energy efficiency. The SED has enabled progress on significant noneconomic issues and more progress on economic issues than otherwise would have occurred.
These successes have created a foundation of mutual understanding and trust and a platform for further progress. History has shown that the ties between the United States and China have been most stable and mutually beneficial when a common interest has united leaders in Washington and Beijing. During the Cold War, balancing the Soviet Union's power in Asia was that shared interest. It generated trust for a very young U.S.-Chinese relationship and facilitated substantial bilateral cooperation. Now, the SED has reoriented U.S.-Chinese relations based on the strategic rationale of sustaining global economic growth. This unifying theme will motivate policymakers in both countries and offers the chance to redefine the terms of the two countries' relationship from simple cooperation to joint management and, perhaps eventually, even genuine partnership. Such a recasting will be an invitation to China to participate in global affairs as an equal -- a position that Beijing covets.
I have learned firsthand that the United States is much more effective at resolving global issues when it approaches them multilaterally rather than unilaterally. On every major economic, political, and security issue, the path that China chooses will affect the United States' ability to achieve its goals. This will also be true under the next U.S. administration. The SED must be used to help manage the myriad economic issues that will undoubtedly arise and help keep the vital U.S.-Chinese relationship on an even keel, productively advancing shared interests while working through enduring differences. It is possible to manage these challenges in a way that advances both U.S. and Chinese interests. And it is my hope that the next U.S. president will expand on the SED to take U.S.-Chinese relations to the next level.
[QQmsn (10-25 12:19, Long long ago)]
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(引用 QQmsn:转一篇Henry Paulson的文章，foreign affairs上面的A Strategic Economic Engagement Strengthening U.S.-Chinese Ties By Henry M. Pa...)说明中国太注重稳定经济增长就是中国最大的弱点bless政府能找到办法，渡过难关，不要像日本一样，恩[QQmsn (10-25 12:21, Long long ago)] [ 传统版 | sForum ][登录后回复]10楼
基本同意比那卡的判断，中国正是因为有了这种笔者才会落得现在的下场非常鄙视这篇文章的作者。说些的文章从头到尾没有任何事实根据，通篇都是些什么我相信，假如我是教育部长之类的废话，典型的国内“智囊团”做派。
反驳，讨论都接受。问题是拿出数据来说明问题啊，停留在文字上的反驳有什么意义和可信度呢？
说什么理论什么的都没有用，用事实来说话就好了。
－朗咸平2001年就在财经郎咸平里用数据分析说海尔，长虹有问题，侵吞国家财产，结果呢？一查一个倒
－2002年，他又说上海社保基金绝对不能入市，揭发社保基金问题。然后呢？前市委书记查出有问题了。
试想一下，他说这些，揭露这些想要做什么？想要出名吗？想要钱财吗？名是出了，可是大家还没有看到他代言什么产品，作什么广告吧？他发表的演讲和言论还是通过论坛和经济研讨等学术途径吧？
试问他得到什么呢？
－从经济学的角度来说，郎咸平在2005年就预言了今天在中国发生的状况了，股市狂跌，楼市套牢，外贸企业倒闭。个人觉得他最近的那篇演说：未来和下一代很悲惨，我都不想讲了,非常的精彩，绝对是朗教授几年来研究的精华。
－2005年，他说人民币不能升值，否则会造成外贸出口加工商大量倒闭。今年第二季度，国务院终于在调研后发现长三角和珠三角大量的民营企业倒闭了，赶紧放慢升值的脚步，这才出现了人民币开始下跌的情况。
－他呼吁的权力监管，都不需要我们说什么大家也知道这是必须的吧？
－他说的国际金融极限战是不是现在正在发生呢？大家看看美元又上升就知道了。为什么上升？发了这么多钞票，根据经典经济学理论难道不是要贬值得吗？这个问题就像大家都觉得中国的宏观调控应该可以解决流动性过剩问题一样。因为那些所谓的精英，智囊学者们都从书本上照搬经济学理论，根本不会从中国的实际情况去想问题，解决问题。
大部分人总是喜欢听好话，讲美丽的话让人觉得舒服。我同意很多人不喜欢朗教授的说话风格，每一句话都很直接。可是问题是对事不对人，他说的话不对吗？那为什么他好多年前的预言一一实现了呢？也许他的标题有些吓人了，可是看看他的二元经济理论，那不正是中国实际情况的写照吗？为什么前几个礼拜中国几个大民营企业倒闭了？为什么那些浙江绍兴温州的企业没有说欠银行多少多少债？因为银行根本不借钱给他们啊，所以他们只能向私人筹款，这个就是经典的冷门行业更冷门了。
中国现在大量的制造业制造的绝大多数产品都是劳动密集型的，而不是技术密集型的。也就是说是发达国家可以制造而不愿意制造的环节迁往中国了。这些是需要牺牲很多资源和环境的，当然目前这个也是中国本身的选择。朗并没有说中国选择制造业本身有错，而是从这个为根本出发点分析为什么国内现在大学生找不到工作，为什么我们也需要提高其他6个环节的技术含量。
这些难道不够现实，不够中肯吗？如果还是像这个笔者说的还要多招大学生，那不是浪费社会和国家的资源是什么？
强烈鄙视这篇文章，看了讲的话都是过场的官腔就来气，反驳都如此苍白无力。至少搞清楚问题的来龙去脉再做判断吧？就好像做投资买股票一样。
[Gucci (10-25 15:25, Long long ago)]
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(引用 Solstice:他说的危言耸听不讨好，不过如果能够引起政府企业对技术创新和研发重视，也算功德圆满他需要以一个 殉道者 的形式出现， 才是一个悲哀)这个道理都懂。可是国企的用人体制不行，管理制度不行。没有人才哪里来的创新和研发。官本位的思想在国企也是很严重的。[hula (10-25 16:11, Long long ago)] [ 传统版 | sForum ][登录后回复]12楼
(引用 Gucci:基本同意比那卡的判断，中国正是因为有了这种笔者才会落得现在的下场非常鄙视这篇文章的作者。说些的文章从头到尾没有任何事实根据，通篇...)他引起老百姓的欢迎并不是......因为他讲的每一句话都是对的, 而是因为他把一些决大部分的所谓经济学家根本不敢说出来的话说出来而已. 楼主真的觉得我们国家那些政府养的经济学家不懂经济吗? 我觉得他们懂, 但是他们大部分时间在昧着良心说话. 就算我这个根本不懂经济的人也知道那些经济学家所说的是瞎说八道: 房地产是中国的主要发展方向;房价上涨是需求所引起的....[tietie (10-25 16:37, Long long ago)] [ 传统版 | sForum ][登录后回复]13楼
此文作者十分脑残！ 不解释。[功夫熊猫 (10-26 0:43, Long long ago)] [ 传统版 | sForum ][登录后回复]14楼
(引用 Gucci:基本同意比那卡的判断，中国正是因为有了这种笔者才会落得现在的下场非常鄙视这篇文章的作者。说些的文章从头到尾没有任何事实根据，通篇...)你太情绪化了，给你段话做参考。。。
For years the financial services have been making stock-market
forecasts without anyone taking this activity very seriously. Like
everyone else in the field they are sometimes right and sometimes
wrong. Wherever possible they hedge their opinions so as to avoid
the risk of being proved completely wrong. (There is a welldeveloped
art of Delphic phrasing that adjusts itself successfully to
whatever the future brings.)
。。。。
注意最后一句。
ps不要让情绪影响了判断。
[门中木 (10-26 0:59, Long long ago)]
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